rare-earth export controls, Congolese cobalt quotas, US anti-dumping
duties on Chinese graphite, a 60-percent expansion of Indonesian nickel
capacity and the first Executive Order calling for seabed mining. The
conversation — and Brazil emerged materially stronger by year-end.¹
and the United States simultaneously signed Executive Order 14285 on
seabed mining. That month alone reshaped Western expectations for both
rare-earth supply and future competitive threats to terrestrial nickel.
additional elements plus processing equipment, and the Democratic
month, three of the most strategically important critical minerals —
rare earths, cobalt and equipment technology — experienced simultaneous
supply-side interventions.²
assumptions. Western automakers, battery-cell producers, wind-turbine
manufacturers, defence primes and industrial-steel customers all had to
re-examine their sourcing. The prices that emerged in response —
dysprosium at US$250 per kilogram, terbium above US$1,000, European
rare-earth prices up to 6x Chinese levels — provided the commercial
signal that reinforced the policy urgency.
commercial dysprosium oxide production outside China together
restructured the rare-earth industry more thoroughly in twelve months
than the previous ten years combined.²
supply continue to dilute Congolese market power. Nickel saw Indonesian
dominance consolidate further while Australian and Philippine capacity
contracted by 54 and 24 percent respectively, creating a more
concentrated but politically fragile supply picture. Lithium saw battery
demand pass 1.6 TWh while Brazilian Sigma consolidated its position as
one of the world's lowest-cost concentrate producers. Graphite saw U.S.
anti-dumping duties reach 721 percent against certain Chinese exporters,
opening commercial space for Brazilian, Tanzanian and Mozambican
producers. Niobium continued Brazilian dominance at 93 percent of global
output, with the CBMM template now referenced in broader
critical-minerals policy discussions.
strategically important non-Chinese critical-minerals jurisdictions in
the world. The combination of upstream production growth (Serra Verde
rare earths tripled, Vale nickel expanded, Brazilian graphite climbed
above Mozambique), midstream investment (Viridis-Ionic at Poços de
international capital attention (DFC financing, European CRMA
engagement, Japanese partnership discussions) reshaped the country's
standing substantially during the year.
advanced, the Brazilian Critical Minerals Association was established,
the Nova Indústria Brasil industrial-policy framework treated critical
minerals as priority sector, and the SGB's geological mapping programmes
delivered the technical foundation for next-generation exploration.³
specific projects that had to be executed, specific contracts that had
to be signed, specific regulatory steps that had to be navigated. But
the aggregate trajectory through 2025 was meaningfully more favourable
for Brazilian critical minerals than the trajectory at the start of the
year.
The global policy response to the 2025 shocks was unusually coordinated.
to supply-chain diversification. The European CRMA accelerated its
domestic-content requirements continued to drive battery-supply-chain
reshoring. Japan and South Korea expanded their critical-minerals
financing programmes.
For Brazil, the policy response created direct commercial opportunities.
various stages of discussion. And the EU-Mercosur agreement, finalised
during the period, provided a framework for long-term commercial
relationship-building that had not existed for previous generations of
Brazilian mineral exports.
dominant-supplier risk is bigger than pre-2025 thinking assumed. China's
ability to move markets with licensing decisions, Congo's ability to
impose quotas, and Indonesia's ability to flood supply are all
demonstrated commercial facts now.
unusually quick by mineral-industry standards. Whether that pace
sustains into 2026-2030 will determine whether the supply-chain
rebalancing actually achieves its targets.
building; the binding constraint is increasingly separation, refining
and downstream processing. Brazilian strategy has correctly identified
this and the Viridis-Ionic hub, lithium hydroxide projects and
battery-grade nickel processing are the priority investments.
critical-minerals projects that advanced most successfully during 2025
were those with strong, multi-year strategic-partnership structures —
sufficient.
moved early in 2025 on offtake negotiations, permit advancement and
capital-raising ended the year in materially stronger positions than
those that waited for market clarity. In a restructuring cycle, moving
before conditions fully stabilise is often the highest-value decision an
operator can take.